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Abstract
The Political Economy of External Discipline:
Constraint Versus Incentive Effects
of Capital Mobility and Exchange Rate Pegs
Thomas D. Willett
This paper argues that while sources of potential discipline over domestic macro economic policies
such as pegged exchange rates, high capital mobility, and IMF policy conditionality are commonly
viewed as constraints, it is usually more productive to view them as influencing incentive structures
in a world of multiple relevant actors.  From this perspective, pegged, as opposed to genuinely
fixed exchange rates, are typically not an adequate substitute for domestic discipline enhancing
measures.  The micro level political economy analysis presented suggests serious limits to the
effectiveness of external strategies as sources of discipline.  Indeed, their effects can sometimes be
perverse.  For example, high capital mobility under fixed exchange rates can reduce short run
discipline over fiscal policy and impede the ability of an independent central bank to counteract
political business cycles in fiscal policy.
The analysis highlights the problems of attempting to use commitment devices with asymmetric
time profiles to overcome problems generated by the asymmetric short run effects of discretionary
monetary and fiscal policies.  In particular exchange rate pegging gives front loaded benefits and
delayed costs. This  makes for a particularly inefficient strategy for trying to avoid domestic macro
economic time inconsistency problems.  Where short time horizons greatly discount  the
prospective future costs of a currency crisis, the political incentives generated by pegged rates often
fail to provide sufficient monetary and fiscal restraint to avoid such crises.  They also tend to
discourage the prompt adjustment of disequilibrium exchange rates.  As a consequence, exit from a
pegged regime is often delayed too long and currency crises result.  Thus the political incentive
structures generated by exchange rate pegging can be as great a source of difficulty for the smooth
operation of intermediate exchange rate regimes as are the economic forces of high capital mobility
stressed by many economists.
The overall thrust of this paper is to suggest that external sources of discipline over macroeconomic
policies are often weak and sometimes perverse.  For many, and perhaps most countries, the
primary focus for discipline should be internal.
Key Words:  political economy, capital mobility, exchange rates, discipline3
1. Introduction
There has been considerable interest in the IPE and economic policy literature on the role of
external constraints, especially pegged exchange rates, international capital mobility, and the policy
conditionality of the IMF as sources of discipline over domestic monetary and fiscal policies.
Discipline arguments for fixed exchange rate regimes such as the gold standard have a long history,
but only recently have they been given a strong analytic foundation in the analysis of time
inconsistency and political business cycles.
1  These literatures point to mechanisms which generate
incentives for governments to engage in policies which bring short term economic and political
benefits at the cost of longer term economic instability.  As a consequence, if the political process
operates with a relatively short time horizon, this incentive structure is likely to generate an
inflationary bias and excessive instability.  Learning by the public should dampen those incentives,
as is emphasized in the rational expectations literature, but the public choice concept of rational
ignorance suggests strong limits on the speed and power of this learning process as far as the
median voter is concerned.
2
As a consequence of the combination of these theoretical developments and the confirming
evidence of the inflationary excesses of the 1970s, considerable support developed in international
organizations such as the IMF and many national governments for the adoption of institutional
mechanisms to restrain such tendencies.  On the domestic front this has been reflected in a broad
movement toward greater independence for central banks and considerable debate over some
                                                
1 See, for example, the analysis and references in Drazen (2000), and Willett (1988).
2 See Willett and Banaian (1988).4
implementation of measures to limit fiscal deficits.
3  On the international side, there has been
considerable interest in, and use of, fixed or pegged exchange rates as nominal anchors for the
domestic price level and there has been considerable debate about the roles of IMF conditionality
and international capital flows as sources of discipline or crises.
4
While unfair to a number of individual authors, it is not jousting with strawmen to
characterize a substantial portion of the recent literature on these topics as focusing almost
exclusively on the role of external factors as constraints over domestic policy behavior.  This paper
will argue, however, that in many, if not most cases, this constraint view is misleading, and the
focus instead should be placed on changes in incentive structures.  The argument is similar in spirit
to that of Bates et al. (1998) who suggest that “Institutions do not impose constraints; the order they
provide emerges endogenously.  Institutions rest upon credible promises, of either reward or
punishment.  They therefore can and should be analyzed as the equilibria of extensive form games”
(pg. 5).
A formal game theoretic analysis will not be presented, but the importance of the approach
suggested in Bates et al. will, I hope, be amply illustrated.  Far too often in the analysis of issues
such as the effects of the European Monetary System on disinflation, analysts have taken formal
models of credible commitment techniques and then applied them without qualification to
situations where the commitment mechanisms in question were far from fully credible.
5  In its
initial stages the European Monetary System was not a system of fixed exchange rates as it was
often modeled and nominal anchor considerations were not paramount.  Indeed, the EMS was
                                                
3 Probably the best known fiscal limitation is the regional one adopted in the Mastricht Treaty which set the stage for
European Monetary Union and the subsequent Growth and Stability Pact. For a political economy perspective and
references to the debate see Willett (1999).
4 On the debate about the IMF see the discussion and references in Willett (2001).  On capital mobility see Willett
(2000a) and on the use of exchange rates as nominal anchors see Westbrook and Willett (1999) and Willett (1998).5
specifically designed to avoid the excessive stickiness of the adjustably pegged exchange rates of
the Bretton Woods system which contributed so much to the breakdown of its exchange rate regime
in the early 1970s.  In its early days, exchange rate pegs in the European Monetary System were
changed quite frequently, and they were intended to be.  It was only in the mid 1980s that parity
adjustments became strongly discouraged.  As a consequence it is not surprising that the initial
empirical studies generally failed to find evidence of the credibility effects posited in the theatrical
models.
6  Indeed, had such effects been found, it would have been quite disturbing for economic
theory.
One lesson of this experience is the importance of paying careful attention to the relevant
institutional facts (details in this context would not be an accurate description).  Moreover, the
problem is not just that the external constraint may be less than fully effective.  As will be
discussed in section 3 below, “constraints” that are less than fully binding can influence incentive
structures in ways that can increase rather than reduce the problems of time inconsistency.  The
asymmetric time profile of the effects of depreciation can create strong incentives to delay
necessary exchange rate adjustments, contributing to the crisis prone nature of intermediate
systems.  With respect to exchange rates, the perverse effect on incentives structures turned out to
be only a minor problem for the European Monetary System in terms of generating inflation, but
for a number of developing and emerging market economies it has been a major one.  They help
explain the hyperinflation that accompanied the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the currency
crises that resulted from the efforts at exchange-rate based stabilization during the 1990s in
countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, as well as the crises in the European Monetary
System in 1992 and 1993.  Careful attention to micro analytic considerations and institutional
                                                                                                                                                                 
5 See Westbrook and Willett (1999).6
structures also allows us to see that while high capital mobility is likely to increase discipline over
monetary policy, it can in some instances reduce short run discipline over fiscal policy, as can even
genuinely fixed exchange rates.
Differences in view about the degree to which institutional arrangements are binding
constraints also has an importance influence on whether to view alternative commitment devices as
complements or substitutes.  For example, several recent papers have compared fixed exchange
rates and central bank independence as alternative means of enforcing discipline.
7  It will be argued
in this paper, however, that where exchange rates are pegged rather than being permanently fixed
then the use of exchange rates as nominal anchors is likely to be more effective if the exchange rate
regime is managed by an independent central bank, i.e. in this context, central bank independence
and exchange rate anchors are complements rather than substitutes.  Such considerations also apply
to the argument that the fiscal limitations imposed by the European Growth and Stability Pact were
redundant since the European central bank was independent.  This argument is correct, however,
only if central bank independence is quite effective, an assumption that is quite unlikely to hold.
8
With respect to the IMF, there is a widespread view, especially in developing countries and
those on the left in the industrial countries, that the Fund commonly imposes excessively harsh
discipline on its borrowers.  This view sees the IMF as extremely powerful, in effect imposing
policy constraints on weak governments through its policy conditionality.  The right, however, has
a very different view.  They tend to see the IMF as having little enforcement power and little
oversight from its principal shareholders.  They perceive an unholy alliance between IMF officials
and borrowing governments under which money is loaned under conditionality programs, but
                                                                                                                                                                 
6 See the analysis and references in Westbrook (1999).
7 See Broz (2000), Clark (1999), Hallerberg (2001), and Keefer and Stasavage (2001).7
neither side expects the conditions to be enforced.  As a consequence of this incentive structure,
critics from the right often see the net result of the IMF programs to be the weakening rather than
strengthening of policy adjustments.  Thus both the right and the left can join in criticizing the IMF,
but for exactly opposite reasons – the right seeing it as retarding adjustment and the left seeing it as
forcing too much.  Serious researchers find that neither of these extreme views fully fits the facts
and there is a good deal of disagreement about the relative weight of these opposing
considerations.
9  The point here, however, is the importance of whether or not external constraints
are strongly binding.
10
It will be shown in section 2 that while fixed exchange rate will increase the costs of
generating political business cycles, the incentive for such behavior will not always be eliminated.
Nor will fixed exchange rates and high capital mobility eliminate the ability of governments to
generate such cycles.  Indeed, the combination of these two “constraints” can in fact undermine the
ability of an independent central bank to keep governments from using fiscal policy to generate
such cycles.
In section 3, the effects of soft pegs and flexible exchange rates are considered.  It is argued
that while providing less discipline than true fixed rates, flexible rates may often provide more
discipline than soft pegs.  Indeed, it seems likely that the use of adjustable pegs would maximize a
government’s ability to generate successful political business cycle.  Section 4 discusses the
importance of different domestic political economy models, especially distinguishing between the
pure opturnistic governments that are featured most commonly in formal models and governments
                                                                                                                                                                 
8 See Willett (1999)
9 See, for example, Bird (1996), Killick et al (1998), and Ul Haque and Khan (2000).8
who would like to pursue stable policies but are hampered by political weakness.  It is argued that
exchange rate pegs and IMF conditionality have much greater scope to be successful in the latter
type of situation.
Section 5 focuses in more detail on the political economy problems involved in exchange
rate-based stabilization.  While pegging is often advocated to overcome the time inconsistency
problems generated by the time asymmetries in the effects of changes in domestic macroeconomic
policies, the adjustment of exchange rates also presents serious time asymmetry problems.  With
pegging, the benefits tend to come early and the costs later, while with abandoning a peg (or
allowing it to depreciate more rapidly) the costs tend to come first and the benefits later.  This
makes temporary as opposed to permanent pegs a poor commitment technology for attempting to
overcome domestic time inconsistency problems.  This helps explain why so many efforts to use
exchange rates as nominal anchors have ended in currency crashes and why it is so difficult to run
intermediate exchange rate regimes in a stable manner.  Section 6 concludes. 
2. Fixed Rates, Capital Mobility, Macroeconomic Discipline, and Political Business
Cycles
To begin it may be useful to offer a brief review of some of the basic economic factors that
constitute the economic environment or set of constraints under which our political analysis must
operate.  These represent physical constraints on the game being played.  In the simple guns and
butter example of introductory economics texts, they would represent the production possibility
curve or in a macro economics example, the slopes and positions of the short run and long run
                                                                                                                                                                 
10 Of course, there are strong differences of view on this issue in the international relations literature, with idealists
seeing international treaties and organizations as being highly effective while realists tend to view them as being of
minor consequence at best.  A promising intermediate approach is taken by the neo liberal institutionalists who tend to
assume that international agreements are neither zero nor one hundred percent effective.9
inflation - unemployment trade offs (Phillips’ curves).  The objectives or preferences of actors
would be reflected in such analysis by indifference curves, which would be aggregated with
differing weights depending on the political process.  Equilibrium is found at the intersection of the
aggregate indifference and production possibility curves.  This is the unconstrained outcome, i.e., it
is constrained only by physical realities.  If this yields an inflation rate that is deemed to be “too
high” in some social sense
11, then the first best solution would be to revise the operation of the
political aggregation process that leads to the biased outcome.  This would cause a shift in the
aggregate indifference curve.  When that is not feasible then there is a second best case for
considering the adoption of an institutional constraint in hopes of promoting a better outcome.
Using a commitment technology to tie one’s hand can then lead to an increase in welfare.
12  Unless
explicitly identified as economic, it is in this institutional sense that the term constraint will be used
throughout this paper.
The basic framework for our analysis of the relevant economic relationships is the Mundell-
Fleming model.  While it has been fancied up in a number of useful ways over the years and is
inappropriate for dealing with some important issues (such as stock-flow relationships, farsighted
inter-temporal optimization, and speculative expectations) it remains the workhorse of international
monetary analysis.
13  It stresses how the choice of exchange rate regimes and the degree of
international capital mobility interact to influence the effectiveness of domestic monetary and fiscal
policy.  Despite the many qualifications added by theoretical improvements in the model, some of
the most important conclusions of the original model remain in tact.  Under fixed exchange rates
                                                
11 An influential exposition of how short-time horizons and the difference between short run and long run inflation-
unemployment tradeoffs can give rise to problems of time inconsistency and result in excessive inflation is given by
Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b).
12 See Giavazzi and Pagano (1988).
13 See, for example, Krugman[1995].  A basic exposition of the Mundell-Flemming model can be found in almost any
international economics text.  A nice exposition is also given in Milner [1997].10
high capital mobility reduces the effects of monetary policy on domestic demand, while under
flexible rates the strength of monetary policy is increased.  Thus we should not make broad
generalizations such as increases in globalization always undercuts national autonomy.
Likewise while high capital mobility increases the strength of fiscal policy under fixed
rates, it reduces it under flexible rates (because capital inflows cause currency appreciation and
reduce the trade balance).  Indeed by providing lower cost financing, high capital mobility under
fixed exchange rates can reduce short run discipline over fiscal policy (see Andrews and Willett
[1997] and Willett [2000a]).  Thus, as Clark et al. (1998) note, the stark implication of the Mundell
Fleming model is that governments cannot be kept by international market forces from generating
political business cycles.  Under fixed exchange rates they could use fiscal policy and under
flexible rates they could use monetary policy.
14
One of the oversimplifications of the Mundell-Fleming analysis is that monetary and fiscal
policy can be treated as completely independent policy instruments.  Thus Clark et al. express
skepticism that with an independent central bank, governments could run an effective political
business cycle policy under fixed rates with fiscal policy alone.  Indeed in a closed economy with a
steep LM curve, they are exactly right.
15  However, with perfect (or very high) capital mobility
                                                
14 On how open economy considerations affect the incentive of governments to generate political cycles see Willett and
Mullen [1982].
15 The IS curve represents the combination of income and interest rates that leads to equilibrium in the real economy.
The LM curve reflects the locus of points of equilibrium in the money market.  A steep LM curve implies that an
expansionary fiscal policy will lead primarily to an increase in interest rates and crowding out of investment, leaving
little increase in aggregate demand.  This corresponds to the impotency of fiscal policy argued by monetarists such as
Milton Friedman.  The new classical economists stress another channel for fiscal policy impotence.  Under the strict
assumptions of Ricardian equivalence, farsighted consumer-taxpayers desiring to smooth their consumption stream will
increase savings and shift back in the IS curve.  The Mundell-Flemming model points to a third mechanism.  Under
flexible exchange rates and high capital mobility, the fiscal deficit causes capital inflows and currency appreciation,
which in turn worsens the trade balance, offsetting the initial expansion effects.  This gives rise to the twin deficits.  For
the first and third mechanisms to operate it is crucial that the fiscal expansion not be met with monetary
accommodation.11
under fixed rates, the central bank cannot run an independent monetary policy.  Any attempt to set
interest rates above or below world levels would lead to massive capital flows which would in turn
force domestic interest rates back to world levels.  Expansionary fiscal policy (a shift out of the IS
curve) would induce its own financing through capital inflows and consequent expansion of the
domestic money supply.   Thus while both fixed exchange rates and high capital mobility are often
considered to be sources of domestic discipline, they can combine to nullify the ability of an
independent central bank to keep politicians from generating a political business cycle.
16
When forward looking expectations and price adjustments are added to the model, then
concern about inflation and excessive levels of government debt could lead to immediate private
sector sanctioning of the deficit through increased inflation and risk premia in interest rates.  How
well markets actually do this is a matter of considerable importance about which there is
considerable disagreement.  The available evidence strongly suggests that the real world lies
somewhere between the short sighted Keynenian version of the original Mundell-Fleming analysis
and the farsighted new classical rational expectations models currently popular among academic
economists.
17  We get important insights from both types of analysis and neither is an adequate
depiction of reality for all purposes.  Obviously, the comparative explanatory power of these
approaches is a crucial research issue.
                                                
16 With moderate capital mobility, an independent central bank could sterilize the capital inflow, at least in the short
run, and avoid monetary expansion or indeed could even contract the money supply to penalize the fiscal authorities for
bad behavior.   With very high capital mobility, however, sterilization is not possible and discipline would not be
exerted.
17  See the analysis and references in Willett (2000a).  While the new classical rational expectations models are much
more elegant, the older Mundell-Fleming analysis is much better for illustrating the important difference between
substantial and perfect capital mobility.12
Consider the proposition that with fixed exchange rates one cannot follow an independent
national monetary policy.
18  With perfect capital mobility this is unambiguously true.  However
with moderate or even substantial, but less than perfect, capital mobility an important distinction
must be made between short run and long run independence.  Loss of long run independence is
generated by the requirement of long term balance of payments equilibrium, i.e., the condition that
one cannot indefinitely expand or contract your international reserves.
Note that if a country’s currency is held by others as international reserves without
convertibility into some more basic reserve asset then a fixed exchange rate by itself is not a
constraint.  In other words the exchange rate peg between the Austrian schilling and the German
mark provided discipline for Austria but not Germany.  Thus it is important to specify the monetary
arrangements that accompany an exchange rate regime.  Countries that maintained a pegged rate
against the Russian ruble after the breakup of the Soviet Union were constrained in the rate of
inflation they could run, but this constraint was for a while in a quadruple digit range.  Indeed in an
early stage the fixed rates of the FSU’s ruble zone were an incredible engine of inflation.  The
mutual acceptability of each other’s ruble emersions with no centralized control generated strong
incentives for excessive money creation which were duly taken advantage of with disastrous results
(see Banaian and Zhukov, 1995).
Now let us return to the case of a smaller country with its exchange rate fixed to a larger
stable partner.  Unless capital mobility is extremely high, the small country will still have some
                                                
18 Of course it is impossible to assure that any exchange rate is truly permanently fixed.  Countries did go off of the
gold standard, the Soviet Union collapsed and countries such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia have broken in two,
with new currencies being created.  In each case, however, very extreme circumstances were present.  Thus in each
case the probability of exchange rates being altered was for a long time extremely low.  While technically the degree of
fixity of an exchange rate is a continuum, it seems reasonable to refer to permanently or genuinely fixed exchange rates
of institutional arrangements where only catastrophic developments are likely to give rise to a change.13
short run monetary policy independence.  The amount of this independence will be greater, the
lower is the degree of capital mobility and the less is its openness to international trade.  Even with
the tremendous increase in international capital mobility in recent years many countries, including
middle-sized emerging markets like Korea and Thailand, have considerable scope for short run
sterilization and independent monetary expansion.
19
In such cases short run monetary discipline comes from incentives, not binding constraints.
It is on the knowledge that the long-term constraint must be met that discipline over short run
behavior must rely and this may not always be sufficient. A genuinely fixed exchange rate wields
its shadow of the future in the form of a high probability that any current rapid monetary expansion
will have to be reversed later in order to restore long run balance of payments equilibrium.  This
will increase the likely future costs of a current expansion.  How powerfully this would discourage
pre-election expansion would depend on the expected future costs relative to current benefits, the
time rate of discount of the relevant decision makers, and the probability that the future costs will
actually have to be borne.  The latter is lowered by the possibility that the decision makers will no
longer be in power when the bill comes due (and hence will likely face a smaller share of the costs).
This probability is also lower; the greater is the degree of noise (in the environment if there is a
good deal of uncertainty about future balance of payments developments then policy makers will
see a greater subjective probability that give rise to that expansionary policy might not have to be
reversed after all in the future).
Depending on the balance of these factors, the long-term constraint may or may not provide
enough incentives for short-term discipline and the avoidance of political business cycle behavior.
Thus even under a genuinely fixed exchange rate, it may not be redundant to make the central bank
                                                
19 See the analysis and references in Willett, Keil, and Ahn (forthcoming).14
institutionally independent of political pressures in order to reduce the likelihood of unstable short
run behavior.  As has been stressed in the literature on monetary constitutions, for a constraint
system to work well, the costs of actually hitting the constraint need to caste their shadow over
decisions made within the constraint, overwise dynamic instability is likely to result.
20   In this
context, it is likely that a central bank that was highly sensitive to short term political pressures
would tend to give insufficient weight to the shadow of the constraint.
Central bank independence would be redundant where an automatic rule to not sterilize
international reserve flows is followed.  Under these so-called “rules of the game” of the gold
standard, non-sterilization would put domestic monetary policy on automatic pilot.  In fact,
however, these “rules” were seldom followed in the short run.  The gold standard was in practice
more managed than automatic, but the greater wage and price flexibility and lower degree of
perceived government responsibility for providing full employment typically gave rise to less
political pressure for short run manipulation of monetary policy than has occurred in the post war
period.
21   Probably the closest to fully automatic monetary systems have been the stronger forms
of currency boards adopted by a number of smaller countries.
22   Of course, as discussed above,
sufficiently high capital mobility would likewise make sterilization impossible under any type of
                                                
20 See the analysis and references in Willett (1987).
21 See Eichengreen (1998).  Of course, the William Jennings Byran cross of presidential gold campaign reminds us that
monetary policy was not entirely apolitical even during the gold standard.
22 It should be noted, however, that there is a good deal of variation among the actual institutional arrangements among
countries labeled as having currency boards.  Then for example, there is greater scope for an automatic monetary policy
in Hong Kong than in Estonia.  See, for example, Dubauskas et al. (1999).15
fixed exchange rate regime, but few, if any, countries have faced such a high degree of capital
mobility.
23
3. From Fixed to Pegged and Flexible Exchange Rates
As one moves from a permanently fixed to an adjustably pegged exchange rate regime, the
balance of incentives tips further away from short term discipline.  Indeed, it seems likely that
adjustably pegged exchange rate regimes maximize the incentives for political business cycle
behavior.
24  Granted there will still be costs to devaluation.  Except for very small open economies,
however, these costs are likely to be less than for the domestic deflation required under genuinely
fixed rates.  Thus the expected future costs of current expansionary policies are reduced.  It is not
surprising that many developing countries have displayed election related patterns in their balance
of payments and exchange rate policies.  Mexico is a prime example.
It is relatively straightforward that a pegged exchange rate will yield less discipline and
greater incentives for political business cycle behavior than permanently fixed rates.  But pegged
                                                
23   The concept of financial capital mobility relevant in this context is the quantity of capital that flows into or out of a
country per unit change in expected return (the interest rate plus any expected change in the exchange rate).
Unfortunately, this is a difficult concept to measure and few direct estimates are available.  The closest variable for
which a reasonable number of recent estimates are available are offset coefficients, the proportion of an increase in the
domestic monetary base that flows out abroad.  The higher the offset coefficient, which runs from 0 to 1, the higher is
financial capital mobility.  While they cannot be converted directly into estimates of the elasticity of capital flows,
financial capital mobility will typically be positively related with the extent to which uncovered nominal interest rate
parity holds, i.e. the extent to which like domestic interest rate equals the foreign interest rate plus the expected change
in the exchange rate.  This has become a popular method of estimating capital mobility but the standard application for
this approach contains an upward bias to the extent that domestic interest rate and exchange rate expectations.  See
Willett, Keil and Ahn (forthcoming).  This suggests that estimates of the extent to which real interest rate parity holds
may be more appropriate, although there also may contain biases, according to the degree to which purchasing power
parity holds.  While often used, the covered interest differential, the nominal interest differential adjusted for the
forward premium or discount, is definitely an appropriate measure of the degree of capital mobility.  The failure of
covered interest parity to hold is a valid indicator that perfect capital mobility does not hold, but a finding that of
covered interest parity holds does not imply that capital mobility is high. The relation of the forward rate to interest
parity will depend on the relative elasticity for the covered arbitrage and speculative schedules and it is possible for an
increase in the elasticity of speculative funds to narrow the covered internal differential while increasing the degree of
capital mobility (again see Willett, Keil, and Ahn [forthcoming]).
24 See Willett and Mullen (1982).  See also Rogoff (1985).16
rate regimes may also provide less discipline than flexible rate systems.  Neither provides a long
run constraint, thus the question comes down to their comparative effects on incentives.
While the economic effects would be largely the same, the political costs of a devaluation
under pegged rates is likely to be considerably higher than for a similar sized depreciation under
flexible exchange rates.  This cuts in favor of greater discipline under pegged rates.  Against this
must be balanced any possible differences in short term benefits under the two types of regimes and
any differences in early warning signals that may be give to forward looking agents.
The traditional political business cycle model is driven by the differential price and quantity
effects from unanticipated macro economic expansions.  In the typical economy characterized by a
considerable degree of short run wage and price stickiness, quantities tend to respond more quickly
than prices.  This gives rise to a non-vertical Phillips curve in the short run.   Its slope will be
flatter, the greater is the degree of wage and price stickiness and the less expected are changes in
policy.
25  The incentives to play the traditional PBC game are a direct function of the slope of the
short run curve.   The flatter the curve, the greater are the initial quantity relative to price effects,
and hence the greater is the incentive to play the game.  With a perfectly vertical short run curve (as
in the strongest forms of the new classical rational expectations models) this incentive disappears
entirely.  From this perspective, flexible rates will reduce the short term benefits from a monetary
expansion induced political business cycle by leading to immediate depreciation.  This will speed
up the price effects and make the short run Phillips curve steeper.  This effect will typically be
greater, the higher is the degree of international capital mobility since this will increase the amount
                                                
25 Strictly speaking an anticipated change in prices would cause a shift in the short run Phillips curve but the effect
would be the same as if the curve were steeper.  Hence, the new classical argument that a credible commitment to
monetary tightening could reduce inflation without need for a recession.  In practice, however, it has proven extremely
difficult to make such commitments immediately fully credible even with the use of strong institutional mechanisms
such as the adoption of currency boards.  See Dubaskas et al (1999) and Willett (1998).17
of short run depreciation from a given amount of monetary expansion.   Thus unless capital
mobility is high enough to prevent the expansion of the domestic money supply under pegged rates,
flexible rates would score better on this aspect of discipline.  By the same token, a government
wanting to play the PBC game would prefer pegged rates.
26
When we turn to fiscally induced expansion, this strong advantage of flexible rates no
longer holds.  Fiscal expansion would induce capital inflows which would limit the depreciation or,
where capital mobility were sufficiently high, would lead to appreciation.  Thus neither pegged nor
flexible exchange rates are likely to provide effective discipline against opportunistic fiscal
expansion as long as a country still has considerable borrowing capacity.
27   Increases in
international capital mobility could thus act to reduce rather than increase short term discipline.  It
can be argued that the Italian experience during the EMS shows that this possibility is not just
hypothetical.
28
This analysis suggests an important qualification to Romer (1993)’ s argument that greater
openness will reduce the incentives for surprise monetary expansions.  Romer’s analysis in effect
assumes flexible exchange rates.  As we discussed, with flexible rates depreciation would speed up
the price effects of a monetary expansion and this effect would be greater, the more open is the
economy.  Thus openness would decrease the incentives for monetary expansion.  However, with
pegged exchange rates, we would expect the opposite to occur.  The more open the economy, the
greater the proportion of an increase in aggregate demand that would be spent on imports rather
than domestic goods.  Since any one country is only a fraction of the world economy, it would face
                                                
26 This would hold whether monetary or fiscal policy were used.
27 At very high levels of debt to GDP ratio, budget deficits are much more difficult to finance.
28 See Andrews and Willett [1997].  This paper also suggests that this may help explain Garrett’s [1998]  [1995] failure
to find that capital mobility has severely constrained the welfare state as many had posited.18
a flatter supply curve for imports than for domestic goods and as a consequence would have a
flatter short run Phillips curve, the more open the economy.   Thus just as the Mundell-Flemming
model shows that the effects of the degree of capital mobility on the strength of domestic monetary
and fiscal policy will depend crucially on the nature of the exchange-rate regime in operation, so
also the effects of trade openness on the incentives for monetary expansion depend on the
exchange-rate regime.
  Another relevant issue is whether changes in international reserves or changes in exchange
rates send better signals to the public about inappropriate economic expansion.  There has been
considerable difference of opinion on this issue among economists, but little systematic study.  My
hunch is that the relationship is discontinuous, with moderate exchange rate changes sending much
stronger signals than moderate reserve losses.  On the other hand, if reserve losses become large
enough to generate major speculative attacks under the pegged rate, then this may generate greater
visibility than the comparable depreciation under a flexible rate.  However, I am not aware of any
systematic research on the issue.
29
It also does not seem clear whether governments have greater incentives to defend the
currency under pegged or flexible rates once a crisis is underway.  Both can be used to try to rally
domestic support for more disciplined policies.  In the recent Brazilian case, it appears that external
discipline arguments became more effective after a currency crisis forced abandonment of the peg.
This may also have been the case for Russia.  On the other hand, the Mitterand government
                                                
29 Advocates of the use of exchange rates as nominal anchors often argue that exchange rates are easier for the general
publics to monitor than the money supply.  While likely true, this seems relevant only when depreciation is forced
under a pegged rate regime.  As an early warning system prior to crises, the relevant issue would rather seem to be
monitoring money supply changes versus changes in international reserves.  Which of these would seem likely to be
more visible is far from obvious.  A full political economy treatment of this issue would also consider the differences in
monitoring by different types of agents.  Today an increasing number of economists are advocating inflation targeting
as generally superior to both monetary and exchange rate targeting.  See, for example, Mishkin and Posen (1997)19
appeared to be extremely successful in using its defense of the franc as a strategy for building
support for tighter domestic macro economic policies.  There are conflicting views, however, about
whether the government itself felt discipline from its exchange rate commitment, or whether it just
used such arguments as a way of gaining support for policies which it felt were desirable on other
grounds.
30  In either event it seems likely that the strong linkage of the exchange rate commitment
to the broader prospect of European integration was an important component of exchange rate
discipline in the French case.
4. Some Implications of Different Models of Government Objectives and the Domestic
Political Economy
Most formal analysis focuses on the incentives facing opportunistic unitary governments
under different exchange rate regimes and conditions of capital mobility.  Also of importance,
however, is the case of well meaning governments who would like to follow disciplined policies
but lack the political strength to always do so.  Of course most actual governments are likely to
reflect elements of both pure types with the relative weights shifting more toward the former as
elections near.
While opportunistic behavior is modeled much more frequently, the case of well meaning
but weak governments may well have as much or more explanatory power.
31   It should receive a
good deal more attention in formal analysis since the two types of behavior sometimes have quite
different implications.  An example is provided by Willett and Banaian (1996).  An increase in
international currency substitution will lower the rates of inflation for both welfare maximizing and
revenue maximizing governments.  On the other hand, for a weak government that does not have
                                                
30 See the analysis and references in Andrews and Willett (1997).20
the political capability to either cut government spending or raise tax revenues directly, an increase
in currency mobilization may increase the resulting rate of inflation (as it takes more inflation to
raise a given amount of real revenues through the inflation tax).
As our previous analysis has suggested, an adjustable peg appears to be a weak reed with
which to try to constrain opportunistic government behavior.  It may hold more promise for well
meaning governments who are seeking to rally political support for their policies.  This will only be
successful, however, if the government follows an active strategy of using the need to defend the
currency to build an effective domestic coalition in support of the necessary monetary and fiscal
discipline.  The competence of the government in pursuing such coalition building, the salience of
exchange rate defense, and the size of the swing group in the legislature that can be potentially
influenced will all vary from case to case.
32    In general, from the theory of optimum currency
areas, we would expect peg defenses to be more salient for small open economies, than for large,
relatively closed ones.
33  Factors such as linkage to European integration in the case of France or to
past experiences where depreciation had appeared to be highly inflationary such as Brazil and
Mexico are likely to increase the salience of defending an exchange rate peg.
A strong critic of exchange rate pegging might argue that there is nothing to the discipline
argument because if a well-meaning government has strong political support the discipline from the
peg is not needed, while if support is quite weak, as in the recent Russian example, then the
discipline will be insufficient.  This misses the possibility, however, of intermediate levels of
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case.  For example, such a perception which did not accord with most of the scientific evidence was one of the
important contributions to the adoption of the strong franc policy by the Mitterand government.  See Andrews and
Willett (1997).
33 See Al-Mahubi and Willett (1994), and Willett (1998)21
support such that defense of the peg can be used to swing enough votes (or political clout) in favor
of unpleasant but desirable monetary and fiscal restraint.
These are also the circumstances in which the policy conditionality of IMF programs can be
effective.  Contrary to popular criticisms, seldom, if ever, does the IMF unilaterally impose
conditions on a country.  Where IMF programs work, it is usually through a combination of carrots
and sticks that are able to strengthen the hand of those in government who are trying to implement
discipline oriented policies.  The Fund appears to be increasing the emphasis that it places on
developing national government “ownership” of its programs.  It would be of considerable value to
have a great deal of systematic comparative political economy analysis of the conditions under
which both exchange rate pegging and IMF programs have enjoyed different degrees of success or
failure in generating greater discipline.  Such research would be of obvious importance to scholars
of international and comparative political economy and should also be of considerable practical
importance for national officials and the IMF by helping to shed light on such issues as the design
of policy packages to maximize political support.
34
The relevance of such analysis is particularly important because the issue is not just the
degree of effectiveness of the strategies, but also whether they will have perverse effects.
Exchange rate pegs that fail often lead to much worse economic situations.  This is a case where to
try and fail may be much worse than not to have tried at all.  Thus pegging should be attempted
only where it has a reasonably high chance of being successful.  Furthermore, as will be discussed
in the following section, temporary pegging can create incentives that increase the odds of failure.
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Of course in our standard credibility models the high cost of failure should increase the
credibility of an exchange rate commitment.  For political economy purposes, however, the nature
and distribution of the costs of failure are highly relevant.  While there is usually a positive
correlation between economic and political costs, the mapping between them is far from one to one.
It is widely assumed in the literature on exchange rates as nominal anchors that the political costs
of devaluation are quite high, but this conventional wisdom has little systematic documentation.
35
From this perspective the prospective electoral costs to heads of state, party leaders, and
members of the legislature are likely to be particularly relevant.  A multitude of political parties and
a low degree of cohesion within parties is likely to lead not only to a tendency to overspend
36, but
also to problems with the effectiveness of using currency defense as a method of imposing
discipline. Such considerations will of course also increase the difficulties of developing
sufficiently broad ownership for IMF policy conditionality to be effective.
5. An Application to Exchange Rate Based Stabilization Policies, the Unstable Middle,
and the Political Economy of Exit
The rash of international financial crises during the 1990s has provided a dramatic
illustration of the inconsistency of high capital mobility with traditional adjustable peg exchange
rate regimes as predicted by international monetary theory, (the “unholy trinity”).  The technical
economic problems of running intermediate (between fixed and flexible) exchange rate regimes are
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(1971?) found that finance ministers faced a significantly higher probability of losing their jobs if they presided over a
devaluation.  This may not provide much of a discipline effect, however, since finance ministers are usually in favor of
more prudent policies anyway.
36 There is a growing literature on how the types of budgeting procedures, political institutions, and configurations of
political power that influence fiscal outcomes.  See, for example, Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini  (1991), Hallerberg and
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formidable, but  John Williamson (1996) points to the experiences of countries such as Chile,
Colombia, and Israel as examples that in the form of crawling bands, intermediate exchange rate
regimes are still feasible in a world of high capital mobility.
37  The recent crises in Brazil, Mexico,
Russia, and Turkey, however, sadly illustrate the limits to the discipline that such crawling band
regimes can provide and their susceptibility to generating crisis.  There are strong political
economy reasons for thinking that these crises were not just bad luck, but rather the result of the
incentive structure generated by the exchange rate regime (combined with the types of bad luck that
will occur fairly commonly).  Intermediate regimes that have been used to fight inflation under
exchange rate based stabilization policies appear to have been particularly prone to crisis.
38
This poor track record of the use of exchange rates as nominal anchors should be quite
embarrassing to the many academic economists and policy officials who advocated such strategies.
A series of theoretical arguments about time inconsistency problems and the use of fixed exchange
rates as commitment devices to overcome inflationary biases and the successful disinflation in
Europe during the 1970s under the European Monetary System resulted in substantial expert
support for the use of exchange rates as nominal anchors.  Advocacy for such currency strategies
spread from academic research to recommendations by IMF and adoption by a number of countries
One major reason for the poor record of this approach is that many advocates of these
strategies failed to clearly distinguish between hard pegs and temporary pegs.  See Westbrook and
Willett (1999) and Willett (1998).  The success rate for the former, at least in terms of generating
low inflation and avoiding currency crisis, has been much higher for the former than for the latter.
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The mixed record of exchange rate based stabilization efforts lead some prominent
economists such as Jeffrey Sachs (1997)(1996) to recommend temporary pegs to aid domestic
stabilization.  The problem of exiting from such temporary pegs before severe crises occur is quite
serious, however.  The economics of timely exits is well understood (see Eichengreen et al [1998]),
but the politics is not.  Thus where the political process operates with a short-time horizon such as
before elections, there can be strong incentives to attempt to delay devaluation or reduce the rate of
depreciation.  The costs of crises can be considerable in political as well as economic terms.  This
gives governments incentives to avoid exchange rate overvaluation, just as the costs of future
deflation will reduce the incentives for political business cycle expansions.  Such future costs may
be heavily discounted, at times however, especially where current policy actions that bring short
run benefits are seen only as increasing the odds of future costs, not making them inevitable.  The
frequency of costly currency crises suggests that the shadow of future costs is often insufficient to
avoid seriously overvalued currencies.
Of course, it is not impossible to exit from intermediate exchange rate regimes before crises
are induced.  The recent moves from crawling bands to flexible rates by Chile, Israel, and Poland
demonstrate this possibility.  To understand the conditions for such successful exits we will clearly
need to focus on political as well as economic considerations, however.  This will require a good
deal of micro level domestic political economy analysis which investigate how alternative regimes
influence the incentive structures of various domestic agents and their relative influence in the
domestic political process.
39   For example, strong export interests may make it “easier “ to operate
intermediate exchange rate regimes without crisis, as they will push against exchange
overvaluation.  Urban service workers, on the other hand, are likely to fight depreciation.  The25
political weight of these groups will depend in part on the structure of the economy.  For small
open economies the export interests are likely to be more important.  Other important
considerations include the political connections of the groups, whether a government of the right or
the left is in power, and the degree of institutional independence given to those making exchange
rate policy – for example, is policy made by the government or delegated to an independent central
bank and in the latter case, how effective is this independence in practice.
The problem is that with a temporary peg, whether constant or crawling, there is a time
asymmetry in the effects of adjusting the parity under downward pressure.  The initial effects of a
discrete devaluation or rapid depreciation on inflation and the blow to prestige and/or credibly tend
to show up quickly, while the benefits of improved trade balance, increasing output, and declining
unemployment tend of show up with substantially longer lags.  Where the political process operates
with a short time horizon this gives an incentive to delay needed depreciations and results in a
tendency for currencies to be overvalued and eventually crash.  On the other hand, the initial effects
of pegging are likely to be quite favorable.  With this time profile skewed toward early benefits and
delayed costs, it is easy to see how exchange rate based stabilization has proven to be quite popular
with many national governments.  It is quite ironic, however, that many disinterested advocates of
such strategies have failed to recognize that with such a time profile of early benefits and later
costs, soft as opposed to hard pegs cannot be expected to be a very effective way to overcome the
time inconsistency problems generated by the early benefits and later costs of expansionary
domestic policies and the initial costs and delayed benefits of contractionary policies.  Indeed while
a genuinely fixed rate would put an effective constraint on the inflationary bias resulting from the
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time inconsistency problems of discretionary domestic macro policy a temporary peg could well
increase rather than reduce this bias.
6. Concluding Remarks
With the exception of monetary policy for small open economies, exchange rate pegs
seldom actually work as the credible constraints of the type frequently modeled in macro level
political economy analysis.  It will typically be more productive to view them as influencing
incentive structures in a world of multiple relevant actors.  From this perspective, pegging, as
opposed to genuinely fixed exchange rates, is not a substitute for domestic discipline enhancing
measures, but a complement.
The general thrust of such micro level political economy analysis is to suggest limits on the
extent to which pegging strategies are likely to be useful as sources of discipline.  A number of
papers have touted the success of exchange rate based stabilization policies and the use of exchange
rates as nominal anchors, but the supporting evidence offered is typically highly selective.  More
systematic study, however, finds that despite a number of quite visible successes, a substantial
majority of such efforts end in failure.
40
Our analysis highlights the problems of attempting to use commitment devices with
asymmetric time profiles to overcome problems generated by the asymmetric short run effects of
discretionary monetary and fiscal policies.  Where short time horizons greatly discount future costs
of an exchange rate crisis, the political incentives generated often fail to provide sufficient
monetary and fiscal restraint to successfully defend the peg over the long term.  They also tend to
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discourage the prompt adjustment of disequilibrium exchange rates.  As a consequence, exit from a
pegged regime is often delayed too long and currency crises result.  Thus the political incentive
structures generated by exchange rate pegging seem likely to be as great a source of difficulty for
the smooth operation of intermediate exchange rate regimes as are the economic forces of high
capital mobility stressed by many economists.
A great deal of political economy research is needed on the ways in which various types of
exchange rate arrangements interact with domestic institutions and political configurations to
promote discipline or crisis.  This topic is another prime example of the scope for fruitful
interaction not only between political and economic analysis, but also between the traditionally
distinct fields of international and of comparative political economy.
While there is a great deal more to be learned, a few generalizations are already possible.
One of the most important is the danger of confusing different degrees of institutional commitments
to exchange rate pegs.  Strong institutional commitments such as the adoption of currency board or
of a common currency are quite different from less well specified commitments.  Indeed, adjustable
pegs may maximize the incentives for political business cycles.  They may increase rather than
reduce time inconsistency problems.  The latter do sometimes work well, as in the cases of Austria,
the Netherlands, and France, but such cases seem to be the exception. To understand the role of
exchange rate pegging in promoting discipline or crisis we need to develop a more micro oriented
political economy framework that focuses on the effects of pegging on the interests and influence
of different sets of actors.  It will be a difficult task to sort out the causal mechanisms at work in the
cases of success.  For example, conflicting views have been offered about whether the adoption of a
currency board in Estonia was an important independent cause of fiscal discipline or whether both
were the products of an underlying political commitment to stability.  Even after extensive research28
there will likely be cases which remain indeterminate.  But this prospect should not deter us from
trying to learn as much as we can.
Another important conclusion is that one should not analyze the case for exchange rate
anchors independently of the traditional optimum currency area (OCA) analysis of the costs and
benefits for alternatives exchange rate regimes.  It is true that the actual process of currency union
is dominated more by political than economic considerations, but OCA theory does have a good
deal of explanatory power with respect to the degree of flexibility adopted in country’s unilateral
exchange rate arrangements.
41  While many of the OCA criteria are difficult to make operational,
and empirical studies find conflicting results on the effects of some variables, the theoretical
arguments that pegged rates have more favorable benefit-cost ratios for small open economies than
for large relatively closed ones are quite strong and these factors do have substantial explanatory
power with respect to countries’ actual choices. Thus it should come as no surprise that successful
cases of exchange rate anchors include many small economies such as Austria, Estonia, and the
Netherlands.  Argentina is not a good fit on the size and trade openness criteria of OCA theory, but
its high level of dollarization made it a candidate on the currency substitution criterion.  France is
not a strong candidate on most OCA criteria (pattern of shocks is an exception) so one must look
more for political explanations for success in this case.  At the other end of the spectrum, the huge
economies of Indonesia and Russia make them very poor candidates for the adoption of currency
boards with which their governments flirted during 1998.
Another important consideration is that the degree of disciplining that exchange rate
regimes can offer is distinctly limited.  Thus such strategies should only be tried where the
prospects for monetary and fiscal discipline are relatively good in the first place.  This helps to29
explain the success of disinflation policies under the European Monetary System.  For example,
while relatively undisciplined by European standards, even Italy had a strong basis of institutional
and political support for stabilization efforts in comparison with many of the former members of
the Soviet Union, including Russia.  Developing some idea of the size of the likely zones of
sufficient institutional and political responsiveness to discipline pressures from exchange rate
arrangements is clearly an immensely important topic for analysis.  Until more is known, however
the high costs of failures suggest that the prescription of exchange rate anchoring should carry a
strong warning label.
The disciplining effects of high capital mobility are also frequently found to be wanting.
Seldom do capital flows operate as actual constraints over policy.  Rather they need to be seen as
primarily affecting the costs and benefits of various policy actions and hence influencing incentive
structures.  In some cases, high capital mobility can reduce fiscal discipline and in many cases a
lack of farsightedness in the financial markets have failed to give early warning signals of policies
going off track.
The limitations of capital markets and pegged exchange rates as sources of external
discipline provide a strong justification for the IMF’s programs of policy conditionality.  These also
seldom act as effective constraints over national policies. (See Bird (1996).  The effects of IMF
programs on the incentives for policy adjustment can run in both directions as perverse time
asymmetries can play a role here as well.  But that’s the subject for another paper.
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The major policy conclusion of this paper is that external sources of discipline over
macroeconomic policies are likely to often be weak and sometimes perverse.  For many, and
perhaps most countries, the primary focus of efforts to promote discipline should be internal.31
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